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Abstract
Hubs, or vertices with large degrees, play massive roles in, for example, epidemic
dynamics, innovation diffusion, and synchronization on networks. However, costs of
owning edges can motivate agents to decrease their degrees and avoid becoming hubs,
whereas they would somehow like to keep access to a major part of the network. By
analyzing a model and tennis players’ partnership networks, we show that combination
of vertex fitness and homophily yields a VIP club made of elite vertices that are influ-
ential but not easily accessed from the majority. Intentionally formed VIP members
can even serve as masterminds, which manipulate hubs to control the entire network
without exposing themselves to a large mass. From conventional viewpoints based on
network topology and edge direction, elites are not distinguished from many other ver-
tices. Understanding network data is far from sufficient; individualistic factors greatly
affect network structure and functions per se.
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1 Introduction
Real networks are neither regular nor completely random. They are random to some
extent and equipped with short diameters and the clustering property (Watts and
Strogatz, 1998). Many networks are also scale-free. In other words, the number of
edges per vertex, which is denoted by k, follows the power-law distribution: p(k) ∝ k−γ
(γ > 0). This implies the existence of a considerable number of hubs, or vertices with
huge degrees, beyond what is expected of a stereotypical bell-shaped p(k) such as the
Gaussian distribution. Hubs play central roles in, for example, robustness against
random and intentional attacks against vertices or edges, propagating innovations,
disease spreading, and synchronizing dynamical agents placed on vertices (Albert and
Baraba´si, 2002; Newman, 2003; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001). Naturally, real
data analysis has focused on finding and characterizing hubs, including the evaluation
of γ (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002; Newman, 2003; Zhou and Mondragon, 2004).
However, vertices other than hubs are also important on other occasions. As an
example, let us imagine a one-shot transmission of innovation or rumor starting from
an arbitrarily chosen vertex. Diffusion studies establish that very first adopters are
regarded too radical or immature to directly communicate the new information to a
majority. Instead, so-called early adopters or opinion leaders, presumably with high
social statuses, credibility, or high connectivity as represented by hubs, receive the new
information from the first adopters and boost its propagation (Rogers, 2003). Apart
from the obvious role of hubs, however, properties of the first adopters determine the
dominant timescale and even the success probability of diffusion, which are important
in applications such as marketing and epidemics. In infinite particle systems used in
physics and mathematics, such as the percolation and the contact process, the role of
hubs (resp. early adopters) are manifested when there are initially many (resp. few)
vertices.
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If connectivity is flexible, agents can even be motivated to avoid becoming hubs
and take advantage of other hubs. For example, computer viruses on scale-free net-
works proliferate by spreading through hubs since they are more accessible from oth-
ers (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001). Then, it is better for the system cracker
to hide behind hubs and exploit them, than to expose themselves to a major part of
networks as hubs, which raises a risk to be detected by the authority or other vertices.
Similarly, intention of manipulating hubs may be present in economical behavior, pol-
itics, and marketing. The tradeoff between a cost of directly spanning edges and a
benefit of having direct and indirect access to others can be formalized by a utility
function such as
∞∑
l=1
klδ
l − Ck, (1)
where kl is the number of vertices at distance l from a reference vertex, k ≡ k1,
0 < δ < 1 is a discount factor (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000;
Watts, 2001), and Ck (C > 0) is the cost of maintaining edges or being exposed to
others. Equation (1) is also related to the growing scale-free network model, in which
new vertices with a typically small constant k are consecutively added to a network.
Based on the assumption of the preferential attachment, newcomers attempt to get
linked to hubs (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002; Newman, 2003). If edges are dynamically
created and removed according to Eq. (1) or similar utility functions, networks typically
end up with wheels, stars, or complete networks (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala
and Goyal, 2000; Watts, 2001). These mathematical results imply realistic network
structures as a result of evolution; for example, stars indicate hubs. However, real
networks seem to deviate from wheels, stars and complete graphs that the utility
model, which usually accompanies strong constraints, predicts. We call a vertex with
a large utility value an elite or a mastermind.
In this paper, we explore how hubs and elites emerge, function, and interact, which
has been neglected except in a few studies (Lau et al., 2000; Anghel et al., 2004).
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Based on thresholding and homophily explained in Sec. 2, we propose a network model
in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we show that combination of thresholding and homophily naturally
generates elites in networks. We also analyze tennis tournament data in Sec. 5.
2 Thresholding and Homophily
Let us introduce the intrinsic weight of the ith vertex denoted by wi. It quantifies the
potential to win edges, such as physical ability, fame, and social status (Bianconi and
Baraba´si, 2001; Caldarelli et al., 2002; Goh et al., 2001; Bogun˜a´ and Pastor-Satorras,
2003; Masuda et al., 2004; Barrat et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2005). Depending
on situations, the direction of influence from vertices with larger weights to ones with
smaller weights can be deduced independently of the predefined edge direction (Anghel
et al., 2004). For instance, whether a computer virus at a host can invade another
depends on the relative security level of hosts, or vertices. Networks with weight-driven
edge direction also underly human relationships.
Another key element is homophily, which means that similar agents, particularly
humans, tend to flock together. Many real data from individual questionnaires (Mars-
den, 1988; McPherson et al., 2001; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987), diffusion
studies (Rogers, 2003), and analysis of online communities (Adamic and Adar, 2003;
Adamic et al., 2003) support homophily according to nominal (e.g. race, hobbies, sex,
religious preference, personal traits) and graduated (e.g. physical distance, age, edu-
cation, social status) parameters. Homophily in terms of vertex degrees, or rates of
social contacts, underlies the fact that the degrees of adjacent vertices are positively
correlated in social networks (Newman, 2003). Various models of real networks and
social interactions incorporate homophily. For example, Granovetter (1973) proposed
that one is mainly connected to similar others, and some weak ties also exist to bridge
heterophilous individuals. Then, the small-world property results because weak ties
shorten the network diameter and abundant homophilous connectivity enhances clus-
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tering (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Hierarchical networks in which vertices with closer
hierarchical levels are more likely to be adjacent are used to address search and con-
gestion problems on networks (Watts et al., 2002; Dodds et al., 2003). We note that
hierarchy is also reminiscent of weight-driven edge direction mentioned before. Other
examples include the cultural exchange models with general homophily (Axelrod, 1997)
and the gravity models with spatial homophily (Zipf, 1949; Barrat et al., 2004; Masuda
et al., 2005). We focus on homophily based on graduated parameters because vertices
are equipped with graduated intrinsic weights.
3 Model
We show in the context of scale-free networks that combination of thresholding and
homophily yields networks with elites. Let us prepare n vertices and choose wi (1 ≤ i ≤
n) randomly and independently from a distribution f(w). We start with the threshold
graph, in which two vertices with weights w and w′ are connected if w + w′ ≥ θ
(Caldarelli et al., 2002; Bogun˜a´ and Pastor-Satorras, 2003; Masuda et al., 2004). A
larger w induces a larger vertex degree k, which is the so-called rich-club phenomenon
(Zhou and Mondragon, 2004). Scale-free networks with the small-world properties
actually result from various f(w); p(k) ∝ k−2 from the exponential distribution f(w) =
λe−λw (w ≥ 0) (Caldarelli et al., 2002; Bogun˜a´ and Pastor-Satorras, 2003; Masuda et
al., 2004) and p(k) ∝ k−(a+1)/a from the Pareto distribution f(w) ∝ w−a−1 (w ≥ w0,
∃w0 > 0) (Masuda et al., 2004). We now supply a homophily rule by making the
connection probability decreasing in |w′−w|. For simplicity, an edge is assumed to be
created only when |w′−w| ≤ c. Together with w+w′ ≥ θ, a vertex with w is adjacent
to vertices whose weights satisfy
w′ ∈


∅, (w < θ−c
2
)
[θ − w,w + c], ( θ−c
2
≤ w < θ+c
2
)
[w − c, w + c]. (w ≥ θ+c
2
)
(2)
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In the limit c → ∞, Eq. (2) becomes θ − w ≤ w′ < ∞, returning to the original
threshold graph. We obtain k as a function of w by integrating f(w′) over the range
given in Eq. (2). If f(w) is monotone decreasing for w > wc ≡ (θ + c)/2, k(w) is
maximized at w = wc. Even if not, sufficiently large w with
1− F (w − c) < F
(
θ + 3c
2
)
− F
(
θ − c
2
)
(3)
satisfies k(w) < k ((θ + c) /2), meaning that k(w) takes the maximum at w = wc ∈
( θ+c
2
,∞). In both cases, vertices with w ∼= wc are hubs. Elites are vertices with w ≫ wc
and not exposed via direct edges to the major group of vertices with small w.
The psychological Weber-Fechner law dictates that vertices may sense relative
rather than absolute differences in weights. To mimic this, let us modify the ho-
mophily condition to |w′ − w|/(w + w′) < c (c < 1). Then, the counterpart of Eq. (2)
reads
w′ ∈


∅, (w < 1−c
2
θ)
[θ − w, 1+c
1−c
w], (1−c
2
θ ≤ w < 1+c
2
θ)
[1−c
1+c
w, 1+c
1−c
w]. (w ≥ 1+c
2
θ)
(4)
For k(w) to be maximized at w = (1 + c)θ/2, f(w) fulfilling
(
1 + c
1− c
)2
f
((
1 + c
1− c
)2
w
)
< f(w) (w > (1− c) /2θ) (5)
is required. However, as in the previous case, the maximum of k(w) at w = wc >
(1 + c)θ/2 is assured even if Eq. (5) is violated.
To consider weight-driven edge direction, we again apply |w′ − w| ≤ c. Since a
directed edge w → w′ may form only when w > w′, a vertex with w sends directed
edges to ones with
w′ ∈


∅, (w < θ
2
)
[θ − w,w], ( θ
2
≤ w < θ+c
2
)
[w − c, w], (w ≥ θ+c
2
)
(6)
which is essentially the same as Eq. (2).
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4 VIP-club Phenomenon
For concreteness, we set f(w) = λe−λw (w ≥ 0). The following results hold as long
as f(w) largely decreases when w ≥ wc, which is supported by real data (Zipf, 1949;
Masuda et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2005). Based on Eq. (6), the vertex degree as a
function of the weight is represented by
k(w) =


0, (w < θ
2
)
e−λ(θ−w) − e−λw, ( θ
2
≤ w < θ+c
2
)
e−λ(w−c) − e−λw, (w ≥ θ+c
2
)
(7)
for θ ≥ c, and
k(w) =


0, (w < θ
2
)
e−λ(θ−w) − e−λw, ( θ
2
≤ w < θ)
1− e−λw, (θ ≤ w < c)
e−λ(w−c) − e−λw, (w ≥ c)
(8)
for θ < c. As shown in Fig. 1(a) for (θ, c) = (6, 5) [Eq. (7)], k(w) (solid line) has a
single peak. Similar upshots result from Eq. (2), (4), or (8) if the thresholding and the
homophily are roughly balanced.
With a utility function like Eq. (1) in mind, we derive k2(w), which is the number
of the vertices within two hops from a vertex with weight w. Although we exclude the
reference vertex itself, this subtlety does not matter when the network is large enough.
The neighbor’s weight w′ satisfies Eq. (6). The weight of the neighbor’s neighbor,
which is denoted by w′′, similarly satisfies
w′′ ∈


∅, (w′ < θ
2
)
[θ − w′, w′], ( θ
2
≤ w′ < θ+c
2
)
[w′ − c, w′]. (w′ ≥ θ+c
2
)
(9)
For a given w, we integrate the density of vertices f(w′′) over the range compatible
with Eqs. (6) and (9) to obtain
k2(w) ∝


0, (w < θ
2
)
λe−λθ
(
w − θ
2
)
+ e
−2λw−e−λθ
2
, ( θ
2
≤ w < θ+c
2
)
λce−λθ−(eλc−1)e−2λw
2
, ( θ+c
2
≤ w < θ+2c
2
)
λ(θ−2w+3c)+1
2
e−λθ + e
−2λw(−e2λc−eλc+1)
2
, ( θ+2c
2
≤ w < θ+3c
2
)
(eλc−1)(e2λc−1)
2
e−2λw, (w ≥ θ+3c
2
)
(10)
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for θ ≥ c, and
k2(w) ∝


0, (w < θ
2
)
λe−λθ
(
w − θ
2
)
+ e
−2λw−e−λθ
2
, ( θ
2
≤ w < θ)
λθ+1
2
e−λθ − e−λw − e
−2λw
2
, (θ ≤ w < c)
λθ+1
2
e−λθ + −e
−λc+e−2λw−e(−2w+c)λ
2
, (c ≤ w < c+ θ
2
)
(1− λ (w − c− θ)) e−λθ + 1
2
e−2λw
(
−e2λc − eλc + 1
)
− 1
2
e−λc, (c+ θ
2
≤ w < c + θ)
1
2
e−2λw
(
−e2λc − e−λc + 1
)
− 1
2
e−λc + e−λ(w−c), (c+ θ ≤ w < 2c)
(eλc−1)(e2λc−1)
2
e−2λw, (w ≥ 2c)
(11)
for θ < c. Figure 1(a) shows that k2(w) (dotted line) has a unique peak at w = wc > wc
and that k2(w) decays more slowly in w than k(w) (solid line) does. Under Eq. (1)
or a simpler utility function with only two terms involving k and k2 (Jackson and
Wolinsky, 1996), vertices with w ∼= wc are elites or masterminds, whereas vertices with
w ∼= wc are hubs. The masterminds are linked to the majority of vertices with small
w and presumably large f(w) only indirectly via hubs. Owing to homophily, they
flock together with others with w ∼= wc, which are usually rare. We call it VIP-club
phenomenon in contrast to the rich-club phenomenon (Zhou and Mondragon, 2004),
in which larger w simply means larger k(w).
Figure 1(b) shows k(w) (solid line) and k2(w) (dotted line) for (θ, c) = (6, 100)
with which homophily is practically absent. In accordance with the standard threshold
model, k(w) increases monotonically in w, and vertices with large w serve as hubs
(Caldarelli et al., 2002; Bogun˜a´ and Pastor-Satorras, 2003; Masuda et al., 2004). This
is the rich-club but not VIP-club phenomenon.
With homophily only (Fig. 1(c), (θ, c) = (0, 5)), the majority vertices, which have
small w, own large degrees because homophily simply interconnects these vertices in
the absence of thresholding. What reduces k(w) for small w in Fig. 1(c) is the lower
bound of the exponential weight distribution at w = 0, which is nonessential. In
consequence, hubs abound in the network, and the VIP-club does not form. Moreover,
the homophily-only configuration is unrealistic for two reasons. First, p(k) becomes
8
flat (circles in Fig. 1(d)), which contradicts real data (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Albert
and Baraba´si, 2002; Newman, 2003). In contrast, although homophily prohibits huge
hubs, p(k) of a network with both homophily and thresholding is scale-free (crosses),
as is p(k) of the the threshold graph without homophily (squares). This is because
elites are scarce even if they exist. Second, too strong homophily mars communication
between vertices with distant weights. With the density of edges given, the diameter
becomes too large in a strongly homophilous network due to the scarceness of shortcuts
bridging heterophilous vertices (Granovetter, 1973; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Rogers,
2003; Adamic et al., 2003). The thresholding effect counteracts the homophily effect
to render a network small-world. In sum, the VIP-club phenomenon requires both
homophily and thresholding in our framework.
Since the analysis developed so far is for deterministic dense networks, let us nu-
merically examine sparse networks with stochasticity. An edge is assumed to form be-
tween vertices with weights w and w′ with probability proportional to e−β2|w
′−w|/(1 +
e−β1(w+w
′−θ)) where β1 and β2 are the inverse temperatures. We set n = 50000, λ = 1,
θ = 6, and the mean degree 10. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show k(w) and p(k), respectively,
for (β1, β2) = (1.5, 0.5) (both homophily and thresholding, plotted by crosses), (1.5, 0)
(thresholding only, squares), and (0, 0.5) (homophily only, circles). These results are
roughly consistent with Fig. 1.
Let us next examine a scale-free network in which wi = i
−α is assigned to the ith
vertex (Goh et al., 2001). Then, a pair of vertices is picked according to the distribution
p(i) = wi/
∑n
i=1wi, and an edge is created if they are not yet adjacent. This procedure
is repeated until the mean degree 10 is reached. As a result, we obtain p(k) ∝ k−γ
with γ = (1 + α)/α (Goh et al., 2001). A type of thresholding is embedded in this
algorithm. We implement homophily by supposing that an edge forms with probability
e−β2|w
′−w| after two vertices with weights w and w′ are selected. The results shown in
Fig. 3 for n = 50000 and α = 0.5 with homophily present (β2 = 5, crosses) and absent
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(β2 = 0, squares) are consistent with Figs. 1 and 2. Although we have presented just
two examples, our framework is applicable to other networks with vertex fitness.
5 Analysis of Tennis Players’ Networks
In social networks with homophily, graduated weight variables often exist but are dif-
ficult to measure. In the professional tennis community, players are ranked based on
the scores, which serve as w, gained by winning the singles games of official tourna-
ments. We analyze networks of tennis players, which are indicative of the VIP-club
phenomenon. For each sex, the score distribution obeys a power law with an expo-
nential cutoff, as the rank-score plots in Fig. 4 indicate. The fact that the probability
density decreases in the score w means that better players are scarcer. The players
constitute undirected networks by doubles partnership, and the edges are defined by
two players pairing up in any of the doubles tournaments in a year. Our model can-
not account for some aspects of the data, such as the homophily in nationality and
score-independent individuality in the frequency of participation in the tournaments.
Nevertheless, two players should be strong in total to be successful, which provides
thresholding. Simultaneously, a strong player is expected to stick to a small number
of partners because of the paucity of similarly strong players and the aversion to tying
with weak players. This is equivalent to homophily.
The women’s network based on all the WTA doubles tournaments in 2003 1 has
n = 366 excluding the isolated vertices. Similarly, the principal connected component
of the men’s network based on the ATP doubles tournaments in 2003 2 has n = 367.
We do not consider mixed doubles in which a man and a woman team up. Since the
ranking is updated every week, players are differently aligned according to the rankings
at the ends of 2002 and of 2003. To circumvent noise in the data, we add k, or the
1http://www.wtatour.com/rankings/singles numeric.asp
2http://www.stevegtennis.com/
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number of doubles partners, of five players with consecutive ranks. The results are
shown for women and men in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b), respectively. Although noise is yet
large and the degree distributions are not scale-free, players with intermediate ranks
are somewhat more capable of encountering partners. The data in other years also
have this tendency (data not shown). Players with high scores form a loose VIP club.
Players with intermediate ranks are popular among both stronger and weaker players.
The VIP-club phenomenon is also expected in other social situations. For example,
when choosing a partner of the life, one may set a threshold on social statuses or
incomes. Since they are graduated quantities subject to homophily (Marsden, 1988;
McPherson et al., 2001; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987), maybe for people to
communicate efficiently and live in comfort, those in upper-middle classes may be
more promising in finding partners than those too close to the top. Similarly, scientific
collaboration networks may exhibit the VIP-club phenomenon particularly in the fields
like mathematics where coauthorship is rather strict. A group of strong researchers
generally publishes their work in nice journals (thresholding), and researchers with close
abilities may flock together to coauthor (homophily). The age also shows homophily
(Marsden, 1988; McPherson et al., 2001; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987), and
the population density, or f(w), naturally decreases in the age, or w. Consequently,
business or social activities that accompany thresholding on ages can result in VIP
clubs formed by the old. More generally, hierarchical organizations of the pyramid
type, such as companies and bureaucracies (Watts et al., 2002; Dodds et al., 2003), are
likely to have VIP clubs.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that the combination of homophily and thresholding on graduated
vertex weights induces networks with elites. Loss of homophily leads to the rich-club
phenomenon (Zhou and Mondragon, 2004), while unrealistically many hubs emerge if
11
without thresholding. A VIP club is invisible to the majority of vertices with small
weights. They can even escape the eyes of network analyzers unless the weight-driven
edge direction in addition to the predefined edge direction, which are more readily
obtained, are actually inspected (Anghel et al., 2004). Actually, elites and the major-
ity of vertices with small weights remain undistinguished if based on vertex properties
such as k, the closeness centrality, the reach centrality, the betweenness centrality, or
the local clustering coefficient (Newman, 2003; Scott, 2000). They occupy structurally
equivalent or similar locations of a network (Scott, 2000). Paradoxically, complete un-
derstanding of connectivity and edge direction is not necessarily sufficient for knowing
a network (Anghel et al., 2004). To understand the nature of a network, intrinsic
properties of individual vertices must be taken into account.
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Figure captions
Figure 1: Theoretically evaluated k(w) (solid lines) and k2(w) (dotted lines) for the
threshold graph supplemented by homophily. We set λ = 1, and (a) (θ, c) = (6, 5), (b)
(6, 100), and (c) (0, 5). For clarity, k2(w) is normalized so that the maximum is 1. (d)
p(k) for (θ, c) = (6, 5) (crosses), (θ, c) = (6, 100) (squares), (θ, c) = (0, 5) (circles), and
p(k) ∝ k−2 (line).
Figure 2: Numerically obtained (a) k(w) and (b) p(k) for the modified threshold
graph. We set n = 50000, λ = 1, θ = 6, and (β1, β2) = (1.5, 0.5) (crosses), (β1, β2) =
(1.5, 0) (squares), and (β1, β2) = (0, 0.5) (circles). The lines in (a) and (b) correspond
to k(w) ∝ eλw and p(k) ∝ k−2, respectively, which are the predictions by the threshold
graph without homophily.
Figure 3: (a) The results for the model by Goh et al. (2001) with n = 50000
and α = 0.5. (a) k(w) and (b) p(k) for β2 = 5 (crosses) and β2 = 0 (squares). The
theoretical estimates k(w) ∝ w−α and p(k) = k−(α+1)/α = k−3 are indicated by lines.
Figure 4: Dependence of the score (w) on the rank of female (crosses) and male
(circles) tennis players, based on the ranking at the end of 2003.
Figure 5: Vertex degrees of the (a) women’s and (b) men’s tennis networks in 2003.
The number of partners summed over five players with consecutive ranks are plotted.
The players are arranged according to the ranking at the ends of 2002 (dotted lines)
and of 2003 (solid lines).
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